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Abstract:  Contracts are an important dimension of modern agriculture because they facilitate
vertical coordination between producers and downstream processors and handlers.  Because
contracts are normally not settled in an open-market environment, establishing price(s) for
contract sales is a pressing issue.  When contract production is marketed contemporaneously with
production sold through a spot market, a convenient alternative is to specify the contract price in
terms of the subsequent cash price.  This paper examines the competitive implications of such
pricing arrangements, focusing in particular upon so-called “top of the market pricing (TOMP)”
in cattle procurement, wherein the contract guarantees the producer the highest cash price
prevailing at the time of delivery.  These contracts are shown to have anticompetitive
consequences when the same buyers who purchase contract cattle with the TOMP clause also
compete to procure cattle in the subsequent spot market.  By committing to purchase cattle at a
spot price to be determined later, beef packers’ incentives to compete aggressively in the spot
market are attenuated.  Although TOMP pricing is not in producers’ collective interest, rational
sellers may nonetheless sign these contracts, in some cases with little or no financial inducement.
Acknowledgements:  Without implicating them for the paper’s shortcomings, the authors wish to
thank Giacomo Bonanno, John Crespi, Rachael Goodhue, Rob Innes and seminar participants at
the University of Arizona and the University of California, Berkeley for helpful comments.
Copyright 2002 by Tian Xia and Richard J. Sexton.  All rights reserved.  Readers may make
verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this
copyright notice appears on all such copies.1
Can Food Processors Use Contracts to Influence Farm Cash Prices?
The Competitive Implications of Top-of-the-Market and related pricing Clauses
Vertical coordination between producers and processor/marketers through various types of
contracting is an important dimension of modern agriculture (e.g.,  Tweeten and Flora, 2001;
Galizzi and Venturini, 1999).  In many industries both contract and cash markets co-exist in the
sense that some of the market output is procured through contracts, while some is procured
through conventional spot exchange.
1  One reason to favor contract marketing is that the contract
enables the buyer and seller to specify various attributes of the product to be exchanged and to
specify price premiums and discounts associated with those attributes.  However, because
contracts are normally not settled in an open-market environment, establishing price(s) for
contract sales is a pressing issue.  Various mechanisms are in practice, including establishing a
base price through cooperative bargaining or from a related open-market exchange such as a
futures market.  When contract production is marketed contemporaneously with production sold
through a spot market, a convenient alternative is to specify the contract base price in terms of the
yet-to-be-determined cash price (Purcell, 1999; Tweeten and Flora 2001).
In this paper we examine the competitive implications of such pricing arrangements,
focusing in particular on so-called “top-of-the-market pricing” (TOMP), used as a tool to
establish price in cattle contracts and discussed first by Davis (2000).  We show that TOMP
contracts are likely to have anticompetitive consequences when the same buyers who purchase
contract cattle with the TOMP clause also compete to procure cattle in the subsequent spot
market.  The intuition behind this conclusion is straightforward—by having committed to
purchase cattle at a spot price to be determined later, beef packers increase their marginal costs of
acquisition in the spot market and, thus, attenuate their incentive to compete aggressively in the
spot market.  Although the TOMP contracts are not in producers’ collective interest, we show
that, nonetheless, rational sellers may sign TOMP contracts, in some cases with little or no2
financial inducement.  Although we focus on TOMP contracts in the context of the U.S. cattle
industry, the analysis applies broadly to any setting where marketed product in a given period
may be transacted either through contracts or cash exchange, some buyers participate in both
contract and cash purchases, and contract terms are tied to the subsequent cash price.
Cattle Markets and Captive Supplies
Beef packing has become one of the most concentrated industries in the United States  (Ward,
2002).  From 1976 to 1998, the four-firm concentration ratio of U.S. steer and heifer slaughter
increased from 25 to 80 percent (USDA, Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards
Administration (GIPSA), 2000; Ward, 2002).  Coincidental with this rise in horizontal
concentration, the beef-packing industry has experienced greater vertical coordination between
the production and processing sectors.  Packers have increasingly used non-cash methods to
procure cattle, including forward contracts, marketing agreements, and packer-owned cattle.
Forward contracts include fixed-price contracts and basis contracts, which use a pricing formula.
Marketing agreements set up a purchasing and selling relationship between packers and
producers, usually based upon a pricing formula. Cattle procured through these “captive supply”
methods accounted for 32.3 percent of total slaughter of the four largest packers in 1999 (USDA
GIPSA, 2002).
Concerns about the effect of captive supply arrangements on cattle prices have been
widespread, culminating in legislation proposed as part of the 2002 U.S. Farm Bill to ban most
packer ownership of cattle.  Although the empirical evidence on balance suggests a modest
inverse relationship between captive supplies and cash market prices, establishing a causal link
has been elusive.
2  As Ward, Koontz, and Schroeder (1998) noted, by removing a share of cattle
                                                                                                                                                                                                
1 A partial list of such industries includes cattle, hogs, wine grapes, corn, and various fresh produce
commodities.
2 Studies finding a negative relationship between captive supplies and fed cattle cash prices include Elam
(1992), Schroeder et al. (1993), and Schroeter and Azzam (1999).  Ward, Koontz, and Schroeder (1998)
found that the percentage deliveries of forward-contracted and marketing-agreement fed cattle could reduce3
from the cash market, captive supplies have the effect of reducing both demand and supply to the
cash market.  In a competitive market model, the effect on price from these shifts is ambiguous
and depends upon the functional forms of demand and supply.  However, the competitive markets
assumption may not be appropriate for cattle markets in light of rapid increases in seller
concentration.
A few studies have analyzed captive supplies in cattle markets using models of imperfect
competition.  Love and Burton (1999) showed that a dominant beef-packing firm has an incentive
to use upstream integration to reduce efficiency losses resulting from its monopsony behavior.
However, the effect on the cash price from such integration is ambiguous. Azzam (1998)
developed an equilibrium displacement model of cattle procurement and also found the price
effect of captive supplies to be ambiguous.  Zhang and Sexton (2000) constructed a spatial model
to show that, in certain situations, packers can use exclusive contracts to create geographic
buffers, which can reduce competition in the cash market and result in a lower cash price.
Our analysis of contracts with a TOMP clause provides a concrete example of how
contracts can be used to affect price in the cash market.  The TOMP contract does not have a
fixed price. Instead, it specifies that the packer will pay the producer the highest cash price in the
market at the time of delivery (Davis, 2000). Davis argued that TOMP contracts may be anti-
competitive because they resemble both a contemporary most-favored-customer (MFC) clause
and a best-price clause.  In a more general context, Schroeter and Azzam (1999) and Purcell
(1999) have expressed concerns about the “typical formula price contract [which] attaches the
final price to some observable cash price series or to a price being paid to others by the buyer”
(Purcell, p. 18).
3 None, however, have provided rigorous analyses to justify their concerns and to
indicate the potential magnitude of the anticompetitive effect emanating from such contracts.  Nor
                                                                                                                                                                                                
the cash price but total captive supplies had no significant adverse effects on cash price.  Hayenga and
O’Brien (1992) also found the effect of captive supplies on the cash price to be ambiguous.4
has anyone provided an explanation for producers’ willingness to sign such contracts if their
effect will be to reduce the future cash price and, hence, the price received under the formula
contracts.
The TOMP clause is similar to MFC and meet-or-release (MOR) pricing clauses, but
with some important differences. An MFC clause commits a seller to compensate customers for
the difference between their purchase prices and the lowest price offered by the same seller
during a specified period following their purchases (Cooper, 1986).  A MOR clause requires the
firm to match the lowest offer by all firms in a market area or release its customers from their
contracts (Holt and  Scheffman, 1987). Cooper demonstrated that, because MFC contracts
penalize a firm’s own future price cuts, they help the firms collude implicitly to achieve higher
profits.  Holt and Scheffman (1987) showed that the use of both MFC and MOR clauses makes
firms’ effective strategies similar to quantity-choosing strategies in Cournot competition, in
contrast to the harsher competition that prevails in a price-setting (Bertrand) equilibrium.
Schnitzer (1994) argued that an MOR clause is more powerful than an MFC clause as a tool to
reduce competition. Duopoly firms in her finite-period, price-setting model, were able to achieve
the monopoly price in all but the last period through the use of contracts with MOR clauses.
Our model with TOMP pricing is quite different from previous studies of MFC and MOR
contracts.  MFC and MOR contracts specify a fixed price, but offer the possibility that the price
may later be adjusted in the consumer’s favor.  Presumably a rational, price-taking consumer
could recognize, for example, that an MFC clause makes future price cuts by the seller less likely,
but if the consumer does not intend to make a purchase in the future (e.g., as would be true for
most consumer durables), this effect is an externality to the consumer’s purchase decision.
However, TOMP contracts do not have a base price, and a player’s acceptance of a contract with
a TOMP clause will, as we show, affect adversely the price he does receive or pay.  This result
                                                                                                                                                                                                
3 Ward et al. (2000) report that formula-priced contracts based on cash-market prices are the most common
method of hog procurement in the U.S., with 32.3% of sales in 1999.  Similar contract pricing5
raises the question of why rational agents would agree to sign these contracts and makes the
acceptance of TOMP contracts a crucial issue to study.
Contract acceptance has not been an issue in the literature on MFC and MOR contracts,
perhaps because these studies focus on consumer markets where it may be appropriate to depict
passive buyers, whose behavior can be subsumed in a demand curve.  However, in markets for
the procurement of agricultural raw product inputs and cattle procurement markets in particular, it
is important to consider rational agents on both sides of the market and to analyze producers’
incentives to accept or reject any TOMP contracts they are offered.
The Basic Model Structure
Consider a duopsony market where two beef packers (A and B) procure cattle from N identical
cattle producers. We adopt the convention of using female pronouns when referring to packers
and male pronouns when referring to producers.  Producers are assumed to be price takers in their
production and sales decisions, so N is implicitly considered to be a “large” number, as would be
true in the U.S. cattle sector and most agricultural industries.  Each cattle producer has a short-run
supply function,  ( ) qfww == , where q is the quantity of cattle offered for sale by a producer,
and w is the price the cattle producer receives. The industry supply function is  s QNqNw. ==
This simple specification of supply facilitates exposition and enables us to obtain analytical
solutions.  The results are robust to more general specifications of the supply function, as we
demonstrate in the expanded version of this paper (Xia and Sexton, 2002).
Each packer converts cattle, Q, into a finished product, G (e.g., boxed beef), according to
a fixed-proportions production function, G = min{Q/l, h(Z)}, where Z is a vector of processing
inputs, and  l is the conversion factor between cattle and boxed beef. Without losing further
generality, we can set l equal to 1 through choice of measurement units, and then G = Q.
                                                                                                                                                                                                
arrangements are in place in other countries as well.6
We assume for simplicity that the market for processed output is perfectly competitive,
and packers take output price, P, as given.
4  We also assume average and marginal costs
associated with the processing inputs, Z, are constant, C, per unit.  Thus, packers receive gross
profits R = P - C, for processing each unit of cattle. The net per-unit profits are R - w.
We consider two markets that evolve sequentially in time.  First, producers and packers
may transact cattle through a contract market, and, later, cattle not committed in the contract
market will be offered for cash sale in a spot market.  At the time of the cash market, the
producers with contracts deliver the cattle under contract to the designated packer.  We assume
quantity (Cournot-Nash) competition in both the contract and cash markets.  Subscripts 1 and 2
are used to represent the contract market and cash market, respectively, and subscripts s and d to
denote supply and demand, respectively.
The Market Without TOMP Clauses
To provide a benchmark to evaluate the market equilibrium in the presence of TOMP contracts,
we first study the case when contracts do not include the TOMP clause.  The contract in the basic
model is a fixed price and quantity contract. The game evolves in two stages.  In Stage I, each
cattle producer decides whether to sell his cattle in the contract market or in the cash market.
Then Packers A and B compete by deciding the quantities of cattle to purchase in the contract
market. In Stage II, each packer chooses how many cattle to buy in the cash market, and the
producers who did not sell through the contract market sell their cattle in the cash market.  The
model is solved using backward induction.
Suppose  1 n  ( 1 0nN ££) producers have elected to sell cattle in the contract market,
and  1 Nn -  producers remain to sell in the cash market. The cash-market cattle supply function is
                                                                
4 One justification for this assumption is to note that, relative to live cattle, processed boxed beef is easy to
store and transport, so the relevant geographic market for the finished product is broader than markets for
the acquisition of live cattle. This greater geographic scope will generally mean greater competition in the
output market than in the market for procurement of the raw product (Rogers and Sexton, 1994).7
2,s1212 Q(Nn)f(w)(Nn)w =-=- .
The cash-market demand is 
AB
2,d22 QQQ =+. The market clears when  2,s2,d QQ = , from which
we obtain ( )
AB
2221 w(QQ)Nn =+- .
Packer  j’s profit function in the cash market is 
jj
222 (Rw)Q p=- , j = 1,2. Packer j
chooses the quantity of cattle to purchase to maximize her profit. The first-order conditions can
be solved to yield the following reaction functions:
(1)
AB
212 Q(Nn)R2Q2 =-- .
 (2)
BA
212 Q(Nn)R2Q2 =-- .
By solving equations (1) and (2) simultaneously and substituting the solutions for 
A
2 Q  and 
B
2 Q
back into the market clearing condition, we find the equilibrium price and quantity in the cash
market as follows:  2 w2R3 =  and  2,s2,d1 QQ2R(Nn)3 ==- .
Turning now to Stage I,  1 n  producers sell cattle in the contract market, so the total
supply function in the contract market is  1,s1111 Qnf(w)nw == . The contract market demand is
AB
1,d11 QQQ =+. The market clears when  1,s1,d QQ = , from which we obtain
AB
1111 w(QQ)n =+ . Packer j, chooses 
j
1 Q  to maximize her profit, 
jj
111 (Rw)Q p=- , from the
contract market.  We obtain A’s and B’s reaction functions from the first-order conditions to their
optimization problems, solve them simultaneously, and then substitute the results back to the
market clearing condition to find the equilibrium price and quantity in the contract market as
follows:  1 w2R3 =  and  1,s1,d1 QQ2Rn3 == .
The equilibrium price in the basic model, 2R/3, is the same as the Cournot equilibrium
price when there are two duopsony packers and only one market, either contract or cash. Because
the equilibrium prices in the two markets are equal, each producer is indifferent between selling
through the contract market or the cash market and, thus, randomly chooses one market in which8
to sell. Therefore, the shares of cattle sold through the contract market and cash market are
indeterminate.  In the equilibrium each producer sells  12 qww2R3 ===  cattle, and each
packer purchases 
AR QQRN3 ==  cattle in total from the two markets.
The TOMP Model
Now consider the case when contracts have the TOMP clause. This model evolves in three stages.
In Stage I, both packers compete in the numbers of producers, 
A
1 n  and 
B
1 n , to whom they offer
the TOMP contracts.  Producers who are offered a TOMP contract must decide whether to accept
or reject it.  In Stage II, but still at the same period of the contract market, each producer who has
signed a TOMP contract independently decides how many cattle, 
c q , to produce and deliver at
the time of the cash market, where superscript c denotes quantity in the contract market.  In Stage
III, at the time of the cash market, each cattle producer with a contract delivers those cattle to his
designated packer. Packers also compete in the quantities of cattle to purchase in the cash market,
where all supply not previously committed by contracts is offered. The TOMP model is solved
using backward induction, beginning with Stage III.
Suppose S = 
AB
11 nn +  producers signed the TOMP contract with a packer at the time of
the contract market.  At the time of the cash market, each producer with a contract delivers 
c q
cattle to his packer. The cash market supply function is
( ) ( ) ( ) 2,s22 QNSfwNSw =-=- .
The cash market demand is 
AB
2,d22 QQQ =+. The market clears when  2,s2,d QQ = , from which
we obtain  ( ) ( )
AB
222 wQQNS =+- . Each packer must decide how many cattle to buy through
the cash market in order to maximize her total profit over both the contract and the cash market.
Packer j chooses 
j
2 Q  to maximize
jjjcjj
122122 (Rw)qn(Rw)Q,jA,B p=p+p=-+-= ,9
where  2 w  is the price for both markets due to the TOMP contracts. From the first-order
conditions we obtain the following reaction functions:
(3) ( )
ABAc
221 QNSR2Q2nq2 =--- .
(4) ( )
BABc
221 QNSR2Q2nq2 =--- .
Equations (3) and (4) are solved simultaneously, and the results are substituted into the market
clearing condition to obtain the equilibrium quantities and price in the cash market:
(3’) ( )
ABcAc
211 QNSR3nq32nq3 =-+- ,
(4’) ( )
BAcBc
211 QNSR3nq32nq3 =-+- ,
(5)   ( )
c
2 w2R3Sq3NS Øø =-- ºß .
Turning now to Stage II, each producer who has signed a TOMP contract chooses an
output level to produce.  Individual producers make production decisions as price takers, so the
producer with a contract decides his supply based upon the expected cash market price, given the
TOMP clause in the contract. Thus, we have
(6)
c
22 qf(w)w == .
Substitute (5) into (6) and solve for 
c q to obtain
(6’) ( ) ( )
c q(S)2NSR3N2S =-- .
Similarly,
(5’) ( ) ( )
c
2 w(S)q2NSR3N2S ==-- .
In Stage I, each packer seeks to maximize her total profit from the two markets by
choosing an optimal number of producers to offer the TOMP contracts, given the expected cash
market price and the expected quantity each producer with a contract will produce. Packer A
chooses 
A
1 n  to maximize 
AcAA
212 (Rw)(qnQ) p=-+ , given 
c q ,  2 w , and 
A
2 Q  as specified in
equations (6’), (5’), and (3’), respectively, and also given 
B
1 n . Making these substitutions into A’s10
total profit function and maximizing it with respect to choice of 
A
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Equations (7) and (8) show that both A’s and B’s total profits are first increasing and then
decreasing in the total number of contracts offered and reach their maximum when S  =
AB
11 nn + = N/2.
5
Thus, each packer’s total profit from the game is maximized if N/2 producers agree to
sign TOMP contracts.  However, N/2 producers may not agree to sign the contracts, and we
assume that a packer will not offer a contract if she believes the contract will not be signed.  In
other words, if packers are capable of convincing only  1 n < N/2 producers to sign contracts, we
assume that they will collectively offer the contracts to at most  1 n  producers at the equilibrium.
6
Each individual producer knows that his signing of the TOMP contract will reduce the
future cash market price, which in turn will decrease his own profit. Why then would producers
rationally sign the TOMP contracts?  Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley (RRW, 1991, 2000) and
Segal and Whinston (SW, 2000) have discussed a similar question in the context of consumers
who sign exclusive contracts with a monopoly seller.  These contracts have the effect of deterring
                                                                
5 The results presented here focus on the case when N is an even integer. When N is odd, packers are
constrained somewhat from implementing their preferred equilibrium because it is not possible to secure
N/2 contracts.  The results when N is odd are provided in Xia and Sexton (2002).  The impact on price of
odd versus even N diminishes as N increases, as figure 1 illustrates.11
entry and, thus, consigning the consumers to future monopoly pricing. They study a market with a
minimum efficient scale of production, so that a monopolist can deter potential entry by
convincing enough customers to sign exclusive contracts in the period prior to when entry could
occur.  They show that, by exploiting externalities and/or a lack of coordination among
consumers, a monopoly may, at little cost to itself, be able to entice consumers to sign exclusive
contracts.  As RRW and SW demonstrate, players’ decisions to accept or reject contracts they are
offered hinge importantly upon the structure of the game, in particular whether contracts are
offered and decisions are made sequentially or simultaneously.
We apply a similar logic to analyze cattle producers’ decisions regarding acceptance of
TOMP contracts, whether they are offered sequentially or simultaneously.  However, in this
model, each packer’s profit increases for each producer who signs a TOMP contract, up to N/2
producers.  In contrast, the monopoly in the studies of RRW and SW benefits from signing
customers to exclusive contracts only if it can achieve the ultimate goal of convincing enough
customers to sign contracts so that entry is deterred.
Sequential Offer of the TOMP Contracts
Sequential offers could take various forms. We follow the general structure set forth by RRW
(1991, p. 1141).  Packers offer the TOMP contracts to producers sequentially.  Each producer
who is offered a contract publicly makes a permanent decision on whether to sign the contract or
not.  Packers can discriminate among producers both in the sense of differentiating bonus
payments for signing and in offering contracts to some producers but not others.  When making
his own decision, each producer knows the decisions of all producers who preceded him in the
sequence.
                                                                                                                                                                                                
6 This assumption is for convenience only and can be motivated by appeal to (unmodeled) costs associated
with offering contracts.  Results do not change if packers collectively offer N/2 contracts, but, possibly, less
than N/2 are signed, based upon producers’ rational accept/reject decisions.12
We assign producers index numbers i = 1,…,N to coincide with the sequential order in
which each is considered for a TOMP contract, recognizing that for some i no contract will be
offered.  Each producer i who is offered a contract faces the decision si to sign it (si = 1) or not
sign (si = 0).  We assume that if a producer is indifferent between signing  or not signing a







= ￿ as the number of producers who have signed prior to the
t
th producer (2tN ££ ) who is offered a contract, and set S
1=0.  S
t summarizes all relevant
information for a player regarding moves in the game preceding his own. From the preceding
results, the incremental loss in producer surplus (PS) to each producer from the t
th producer









Substituting from (5’) and (6’) for w2 and q, respectively, obtains
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The loss in producer’s surplus, DPS, is increasing in 
t S .
On the other hand, the signing of an additional contract by the t
th producer, given 
t S ,
yields the following incremental profit to each packer:
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t D(S) is decreasing in 
t S .  If D(S
t)  > 0, each packer
has incentive to offer a large enough signing bonus to reimburse the t
th producer’s loss from
signing, given the number, S
t, of producers that have signed before him, and thereby insure the13
signing of the contract. If N8 ‡ , it is straightforward to show that D > 0 for  ( )
t 0SN22 ££-
and D < 0 for  ( )
t SN21 ‡- . Thus, if the total number of producers is sufficiently large, namely
8 or more, duopsony packers have incentive to jointly convince  ( ) ( ) [N22]1N/21 -+=-
producers to sign the contracts.
Assume N ‡ 8, and consider then the decision of producer (N/2)-1 who has been offered
a TOMP contract.  Regardless of the decisions preceding him, as summarized by 
(N/2)1 S
- , this
producer knows that (N/2)+1 producers have not yet been offered contracts and that each packer
unilaterally has incentive to offer signing bonuses sufficient to compensate enough of those
producers for the loss in producer surplus each can associate with his signing to achieve the
ultimate objective of securing (N/2)-1 TOMP contracts.  Thus, regardless of the number, 
(N/2)1 S
- ,
of producers who have signed preceding him, producer (N/2)-1 in the sequence of offers knows
that his action will have no effect on packers eliciting (N/2)-1 contract acceptances and, thus,
ultimately enforcing price w(
(N/2)1 S
- ) in both the contract and cash markets.  This producer’s
surplus from cattle sales will be unaffected by whether he sells through the contract or cash
markets, and, thus, he will sign the TOMP contract for any nonnegative signing bonus.
A similar logic applies to all producers preceding producer (N/2)-1 in the sequence of
TOMP contract offers.  Regardless of the number, S
t, of contracts signed by producers preceding
him in the sequence, each producer t knows that packers will be able to elicit (N/2)-1 signatures.
Thus, rejection of the contract gains the player nothing, and each will sign for any nonnegative
signing bonus.
Packers can infer this behavior by producers, and, thus, they can, when N  ‡ 8,
collectively offer TOMP contracts with zero signing bonuses to (N/2) – 1 producers.  By
substituting  ( )
AB
11 nnN21 +=-  in (5’) for S, we obtain the equilibrium price,
( ) ( ) 21 wwR2R2N2 ==++ . The results are summarized in the following proposition:14
PROPOSITION 1: When the TOMP contracts are offered sequentially and the total
number of cattle producers, N, is a sufficiently large ( 8 ‡ N ), even integer, all pure-
strategy,  subgame-perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) are characterized by packers
collectively offering the contracts with a zero bonus to (N/2)  - 1 producers, and all
producers who are offered the contracts signing them. The equilibrium cash price is
(R/2)+R/(2N+2), which approaches the monopsony price, w
m = R/2, as N becomes large.
Because the contracts are offered with zero signing bonus, and the contract and cash price
are identical, packers are indifferent as to which of them offers the contracts, so long as the total
number offered is (N/2) – 1.  Thus, all combinations of integers 
A
1 n  and 
B
1 n , such that
( )
AB
11 nnN21 +=- , constitute Nash equilibria in Stage I.
The results when N is odd and when N < 8 are provided in Xia and Sexton (2002). When
N is odd, the packers are unable to offer contracts to (N/2) -1 producers because this number is
not an integer. Instead, the packers will offer contracts to [(N-1)/2] -1 producers (the largest
integer less than (N/2) -1) to maximize their profits. The equilibrium cash price still converges to
the monopsony price as N becomes large.
Regarding cases where N < 8, recall that we have assumed producers are price takers in
making their output decisions. This assumption is most appropriate for large N. When N is small,
the market has a bilateral oligopoly structure, and producers may not act as price takers, in which
case equilibrium outcomes will depend on the relative bargaining power of packers and
producers.  Xia and Sexton (2002) characterize the market equilibria for cases where N < 8, given
price-taking behavior by producers, but those results should be interpreted cautiously for the
reason noted.  Figure 1 summarizes the relationship between the equilibrium cash price and the15
number of cattle producers for the case of sequential contract offers, given producer price-taking
behavior.
7
Figure 1: The Equilibrium Cash Price when the contracts are offered sequentially.
Simultaneous Offer of the TOMP Contracts
The simultaneous offer of the TOMP contracts means that both packers offer the TOMP contracts
to some cattle producers simultaneously and each producer decides whether to accept or reject the
contract independently and simultaneously without knowing other producers’ decisions. After
producers make their decisions, packers cannot revise their offers to those who rejected the
contracts or offer additional contracts to producers who had not previously received an offer;
otherwise the situation reverts to the case of sequential offers.  This structure of play works to the
                                                                
7 The “sawtooth” pattern for the R(N) function in figure 2 is due to packers being constrained somewhat
from implementing their preferred equilibrium when N is an odd integer.  See footnote 5 and Xia and
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packers’ detriment because, unlike the sequential offer case, the prospect of offering additional
contracts cannot be used as a threat to reduce the signing bonus each producer can demand.
Suppose packers offer the TOMP contracts to S = 
AB
11 nn +  producers. Each producer
who is offered a contract knows that his signing will reduce his surplus. The specific loss that
each producer associates with his own signing depends upon the number of producers that he
anticipates will sign.  Suppose a producer refuses to sign and anticipates that S
o producers will
sign.  Under the structure of this game, packers will not be able to make additional offers to elicit
more than S
o contract signings.  This producer will sign the contract only if a packer provides a
signing bonus equal to or greater than the loss in surplus the producer can associate with his
signing.  Each packer, in turn, can infer that she must offer a sufficient signing bonus to insure a
producer’s signing of the contract.
In stage I, each packer decides how many contracts to offer and how much signing bonus
to offer with each contract.  These decisions are related, as described in the following lemma:
LEMMA 1:  When the TOMP contracts are offered simultaneously, for any possible
pure-strategy SPNE, there is a fixed relation between the number of contracts that a
packer can convince producers to sign and the signing bonus, X, offered with each
contract. For Packer A, the relation is  ()
Ao XPSS =D , where  11 1
oAB Snn =+- , and
A n1  is the number of contracts Packer A offers, given 
B n1 . Similarly, for Packer B, the
relation is ()
Bo XPSS =D , where 
B n1  is the number of contracts Packer B offers, given
A n1 , and  () PS D g is defined in (9).
PROOF:  Suppose there is an SPNE equilibrium where 
Ao XPS(S) <D . Then each of the 
A
1 n
producers who sign the contracts with Packer A under the proposed equilibrium has incentive to
deviate from his proposed equilibrium strategy because each of them can gain
oA PS(S)X0 D->  by refusing to sign the contract. Thus, no SPNE equilibrium can include
bonus payments 
Ao XPS(S) <D . On the other hand, suppose there is an SPNE equilibrium when17
Ao XPS(S) >D . Then Packer A has incentive to reduce the signing bonus to 
o PS(S) D  without
eliciting contract rejections, because no producer can unilaterally anticipate gaining more than
o PS(S) D  by rejecting his contract offer. Thus, no SPNE equilibrium can include bonus payments
Ao XPS(S) >D . The same logic applies to Packer B.  Thus, only when 
jo XPS(S) ‡D , does
none of the producers who signed the contracts have incentive to change his decision given other
players’ decisions. Also, given 
A
1 n  and 
B
1 n , no packer has incentive to increase or reduce her
signing bonus from the amount
o PS(S) D , given the producers’ decision rule. Therefore, only the
offers 
ABo XXPS(S) ==D  are consistent with any SPNE equilibrium.
8
Given the signing bonus 
Ao XPS(S) =D  > 0 needed to convince producers to sign the












1 n , Packer A chooses 
A
1 n  and, consequently, 
AA
1 X(n)  to maximize her total profit.


























Because the packers can offer the contracts to only integer number of producers, Equations (10)
and (11) show that the packers must collectively choose either (N/2) -2 or (N/2) -1 producers to
offer the contracts.  Direct calculation reveals that offering (N/2)-1 contracts generates higher
packer profits, thereby yielding the following proposition:
                                                                
8 Based upon Lemma 1, the contracts that emerge in equilibrium are nondiscriminatory (among the subset18
PROPOSITION  2: When the TOMP contracts are offered simultaneously and N is
sufficiently large ( 10 ‡ N ), all pure-strategy, SPNE are characterized by packers
collectively offering the contracts with the positive bonus,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
22 AB322 XXPSN2112N9N8NR8N2N1 ==D--=++++ ,
to (N/2) - 1 producers, and all producers who are offered the contracts signing them.
The equilibrium cash price is w1 = w2 = (R/2)+R/(2N+2) and approaches the monopsony
level, w
m = R/2, as N becomes large.
Xia and Sexton (2002) discuss results when N < 10 and when N is odd. The intuition for
these results is very similar to the intuition for results when N < 8 and when N is odd in the case
of sequential offers.  Figure 2 summarizes the relationship between the equilibrium cash price and
the number of cattle producers for the game with simultaneous offers.
Figure 2: The Equilibrium Cash Price with Simultaneous Contract Offers
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Perfectly Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria
The SPNE for either the sequential- or simultaneous-offer versions of the game are not perfectly
coalition-proof Nash equilibria (Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston, 1987; SW, 2000) in the sense
that if producers were able to coordinate their decisions, they could form a self-enforcing
coalition (e.g., a producer cooperative) that would agree to reject the offers.  Even in the
simultaneous-offer game, producers receive signing bonuses equal to the marginal loss in surplus
that each can associate with his agreeing to a TOMP contract, an amount that is always less than
the total loss in surplus if packers implement any of the equilibria described in Proposition 2.  In
this sense, the equilibria rely upon producers’ inability to coordinate their actions to reject a
mutually disadvantageous outcome.
Although agricultural producers’ inability to coordinate for their mutual betterment is
well known, it is worth considering whether the packers have incentive to offer TOMP contracts
that are coalition proof, especially given laws, such as the U.S. Capper-Volstead Act, that
facilitate producer coordination.  Assume the packers can sequentially offer TOMP contracts to
producers with discriminatory signing bonuses and, as before, identify producers according to
1,…,N by the order in which they are considered for a TOMP contract offer.  Denote equilibrium
prices in the cash and, thus, contract market by w(S), where S is the number of producers who
have signed TOMP contracts, where w’(S) < 0, w(0) = 2/3  (the Cournot price), and w[(N/2)-1] is
the price if the packers sign their preferred number of TOMP contracts.







This producer is compensated fully for his loss in surplus if the packers implement their preferred
scheme.  This producer will sign the TOMP contract, and he cannot be persuaded to make an
agreement with other producers to mutually agree not to sign, because he will receive at most20
w(0) under such an arrangement.  The second producer can, thus, receive the following offer to







where X2 < X1.  Producer 2 will sign this contract, and he cannot be persuaded to join a coalition
of producers who will mutually agree not to sign, because he can anticipate receiving at most
w(1) under such an arrangement (because producer 1 will never join the coalition).  Generalizing,








The vector X = {X1, …, X (N/2)-1} of TOMP contract bonus offers derived in this manner
“divides and conquers” the producers in the sense described by Innes and Sexton (1993).  By
construction TOMP contracts with these bonus offers are immune to the formation of coalitions
by producers intended to elicit mutual defection from agreements to sign the contracts.  Thus,
such offers are consistent with the requirements for PCPNE.
Because the total bonus payments required to achieve a PCPNE exceed the bonuses paid
in the SPNE for either the sequential- or simultaneous-offer game, it remains to ask whether the







Y= ￿  as the total bonus payment
and let  ( ) ( )
jjj w[(N/2)1]w(0) Dp=p--p , j=A,B denote the increase in each packer’s profit
from implementing the preferred number of TOMP contracts, relative to the equilibrium with no
contracts.  In the expanded version of our paper, we demonstrate that Y <2
j Dp , and, therefore,
packers mutually have incentive to implement the TOMP contracts even if they must pay signing
bonuses that are immune to the formation of self-enforcing producer coalitions.   Packers
nonetheless face a coordination problem in implementing these contracts because of their
discriminatory nature; each would prefer to have the other offer the more expensive contracts.21
The PCPNE achieves the same cash- and contract-market price as the equilibrium
described in Proposition 1, albeit with less transfer of rents from producers to packers.  Unlike the
SPNE with either sequential or simultaneous offers, the PCPNE does not rely upon lack of
coordination among producers, but, rather, it exploits only the externality that signing producers
impose upon other producers, including those who are not offered a contract.  Although all
producers receive the same unit price, regardless of whether they sell in the contract or cash
market, those without a contract receive no signing bonus and, thus, are harmed by the collective
actions of those who sign—a fact which is external to the decision of the signatories.
Discussion of the TOMP Contracts
To better understand how contracts with the TOMP clause can depress the cash price, consider
the quantity choices by packers in the cash market. Each finds her optimal quantity to purchase
and sell where the marginal revenue from the last unit purchased and sold is equal to that unit’s
perceived marginal cost.  For the case when contracts do not include the TOMP clause (denoted
by subscript NT), each packer chooses her cash market quantity to maximize profit from the cash
market only, because there is no connection to the contract market. For example, for Packer A,





(13) ( ) ( ) ( )
AAAABAB
NT2222211 MCwQQ2QQNnn =¶¶=+-- .
On the other hand, if the contracts include the TOMP clause, each packer chooses her
cash-market purchases to maximize her total profit from both the contract and cash markets,
given that the two are now interconnected through the TOMP contracts. Net marginal revenue is
the same as in (12) but the perceived marginal cost,
A
T MC , is higher because the cash price
determines the price to be paid for cattle procured through the contract market:22
( ) { } ( ) ( ) ( )
AAAcAABABAcAB
T22122211111 (14)MCwQnqQ2QQNnnnqNnn. =¶+¶=+--+--
The TOMP clause increases the packer’s perceived marginal cost of procuring cattle in
the cash market and, thus, causes the packer to compete less aggressively in this market. Packer
B’s situation is analogous.  Therefore, for any number of suppliers, 
AB
11 Nnn --, in the cash
market, the equilibrium price will be reduced due to the presence of the TOMP contracts.  In both
the cases of sequential and simultaneous offers, for sufficiently large N, the equilibrium cash
price of the TOMP model approaches R/2, the monopsony price. Depending upon the timing of
contract offers and whether producers can coordinate their actions through a coalition or
cooperative, those who are offered contracts may be able to recapture some of the surplus lost
from TOMP contracts through signing bonuses.  However, at least half of the producers are not
offered a contract in equilibrium, and they bear the full brunt of the diminished market
competition caused by TOMP contracts.
Figure 3 illustrates the benefits and costs of TOMP contracts from packers’ and
producers’ perspectives.  For large N, packers are able to elicit signing of TOMP contracts
because each producer’s signing, up to N/2 producers, depresses the future cash price and allows
a packer to increase profit not only from the signing producer but also from all other producers
who sell cattle to the packer. Although a packer’s gain from any one producer (area a-g) is
smaller than this producer’s loss (area a + b) due to the deadweight loss (area b+g), a packer’s
gain from all N/2 of her suppliers (areas a+b+c-h) is greater than the loss of this single producer,
when N is large.  The losses in surplus to the other producers are an externality from the signing
producer’s perspective.
Finally, to gain a perspective on the relative importance of possible benefits and losses
from imposition of a regime of TOMP contracts, consider the simulation results reported in table
1.  In all cases R, the wholesale price net of per-unit processing costs is set to 1.0.  Equilibria
were derived for duopsony packers and alternative numbers of producers for (a) the sequential-23
offer case (no signing bonuses), (b) the simultaneous offer case, and (c) the case of coalition-
proof contract offers.  In all scenarios, packers’ gain in profits from TOMP contracts is increasing
in N, and, not surprisingly, packers gain more when they are able to exploit both externalities and
disorganization among producers, as in the sequential- and simultaneous-offer cases.  For N  ‡
20, packers’ profits increase with TOMP contracts by 10% or more under both the sequential-
offer and simultaneous-offer cases relative to the base Cournot equilibrium.  If packers must offer
coalition-proof contracts, most of their benefit from implementing the TOMP regime is consumed
by the signing bonuses.
Table 1: Simulation Results
Reduction in producer surplus Scenario Increase in packer
profits Signers Non-signers
Sequential offer 11.1% 30.6% 30.6%
Simultaneous offer   6.8 19.0 30.6
N = 8
Coalition proof   3.1   9.3
1 30.6
Sequential offer 12.1 36.9 36.9
Simultaneous offer   9.3 30.6 36.9
N= 16
Coalition proof   2.3 14.4
1 36.9
Sequential offer 12.2 38.3 38.3
Simultaneous offer   9.9 33.1 38.3
N= 20
Coalition proof   2.0 15.5
1 38.3
Sequential offer 12.4 41.0 41.0
Simultaneous offer 11.2 38.3 41.0
N= 40
Coalition proof   1.4 17.7
1 41.0
1 Reported number is the average bonus among signing producers.
Packers’ gains are less than producer losses, due to the deadweight loss from reduced
purchases and sales caused by the lower price—areas f and k in figure 3.  Table 1 identifies the
loss in producer surplus for both those who sign contracts and those who are not offered a
contract.  Except for the sequential offer SPNE, those with contracts lose less than those without
them, but the bonus payments in the simultaneous-offer equilibrium are rather inconsequential as
N becomes large (because each producer can unilaterally command a bonus only equal to the
marginal surplus loss caused by his signing).  Producers’ surplus loss is increasing in N because
the contract and cash price is declining in N, and converges to the monopsony price as N becomes24
very large.  For large N, unless coalition-proof bonuses are offered, producer surplus losses can
exceed 40% of the surplus attainable in the no-contract, duopsony equilibrium.
Figure 3: Welfare Effects from Imposition of TOMP Contracts
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Conclusions
Agricultural economists have been active in documenting the increasing vertical coordination
between producers and food marketers and in identifying the economic incentives for such
coordination.  Little attention, however, has been paid to the competitive implications of the
various mechanisms used to implement vertical coordination.  This paper has focused on market
settings when contracts and spot exchanges coexist.  The common practice of linking contract
payments to the subsequent cash price was shown to have anticompetitive implications in
concentrated markets when the same set of buyers operates in both the contract and the cash
market.
Although we focused on a particular type of contract, the so-called top-of-the-market-
pricing (TOMP) contract, and a parsimonious analytical model with duopsony buyers, the
Cash
Price
















economic forces at work are general and apply broadly.  By committing to contracts that link
acquisition cost to a subsequent spot price, buyers credibly increase their marginal costs of
acquisition in the spot market, which, in turn, diminishes the intensity of spot-market competition
relative to what would prevail otherwise.  Notably, in the case of the TOMP contract, we showed
that duopsony buyers can achieve cash and contract prices that converge to the simple
monopsony price as the number of sellers becomes large.
Rational and informed sellers are not necessarily a remedy to the implementation of such
contracts.  The straightforward logic that “contracts involve two consenting parties, so contracts
could be expected to involve mutual benefits” (Ward et al. 2000) misses the key point that
contracts can be individually rational for producers to sign but mutually damaging for producers
as a group.  Only in the case where sellers could form self-enforcing coalitions were processors
compelled to offer substantial inducements to sign the contracts.  Even in this case, more than
half of the sellers received no bonus.
Given producers’ limited ability to deter the implementation of these contracts, a clear
case exists for their proscription through policy.  The beneficial aspects of vertical coordination
can be achieved through contracts that lack this anticompetitive feature.  For example, the
arguments raised in this paper do not apply when contract prices are pegged to prices in markets
where the contract purchaser lacks market power, as would typically be true of futures markets.26
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